Seeking Admission Or Losing Freedom? The Fifth Circuit Redefines Immigration Detention With Richard Wilson

Hot Topic Bold Talk | Richard Wilson | Immigration Detention

Introduction

Two words. Massive consequences. “Seeking admission.” The Fifth Circuit just used them to justify detaining long-time U.S. residents without bond. If you think immigration law is just policy—think again. This case is about power, process, and who gets to stay free.

Case Summary

In Podcast 173, we examine a case that may appear technical on its surface—but carries profound consequences for immigration law, due process, and the limits of government power. At the center of this case—Buenrostro-Mendez and Covarrubias v. Bondi—is a single legal phrase: “seeking admission.” The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of that phrase has now opened the door to mandatory detention without bond for individuals who have lived in the United States for decades.

The Case: Who Are the Petitioners

The two individuals at the heart of this case are not recent arrivals. One entered the United States in 2000. The other in 2001. They lived in this country for 24 and 16 years before being detained by immigration authorities. When they were taken into custody, they sought something fundamental: a bond hearing. And initially, they won. District courts granted habeas relief, concluding that these individuals were entitled to bond hearings under the law. But that victory was short-lived. The government appealed.

The Legal Framework: Two Very Different Paths

To understand what happened next, we need to look at two key provisions of immigration law:

1.8 U.S.C. §1226

  • Applies to individuals already inside the United States
  • Allows for bond hearings and possible release

2.8 U.S.C. §1225

  • Applies to “applicants for admission”
  • Requires mandatory detention
  • No bond, no release during proceedings

Under §1225, an individual may be detained simply because they are not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to admission.”

So, everything in this case turns on one question: Are these men “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission”?

The Core Dispute: What Does “Seeking Admission” Mean?

The petitioners made a straightforward argument: The phrase “seeking admission” is written in the present tense.

It should apply only to individuals who are actively trying to enter the United States at the time they are apprehended.

Under that reading:

  • Someone living in the U.S. for years is not “seeking admission”
  • They should be governed by §1226—and eligible for bond

The district courts agreed. But the Fifth Circuit did not.

The Fifth Circuit’s Decision

The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that individuals present in the United States without having been formally admitted are still considered “applicants for admission”—and therefore fall under §1225’s mandatory detention scheme.

The reasoning was striking:

  • The statute defines certain individuals as “applicants for admission”
  • Applicants for admission are, by nature, seeking admission
  • Therefore, detention under §1225 applies—even years after entry

In effect, the court collapsed the distinction between:

  • Arriving at the border, and
  • Living inside the country for decades

Why This Matters: A Dramatic Expansion of Detention Power

This interpretation has immediate and far-reaching consequences.

Long-Term Residents Treated as New Arrivals

Under this ruling, someone who has lived in the United States for decades—but was never formally admitted—can be treated as if they are still at the border.

That means:

  • No bond hearing
  • No individualized determination
  • Mandatory detention during removal proceedings

A Break from Decades of Practice

For years, administrations across political lines treated individuals already inside the country as eligible for bond under §1226. Even the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that hundreds of district court cases—over 350—had ruled in favor of bond eligibility in similar situations. This decision reverses that understanding.

The Role of IIRIRA (1996)

The government’s argument relies heavily on the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which expanded immigration enforcement authority.

But the key question remains: Did Congress intend to:

  • Equalize treatment at the border, or
  • Extend mandatory detention deep into the interior of the United States?

The Fifth Circuit chose the latter interpretation.

The Dissent: A Warning About Overreach

The dissenting opinion raises serious concerns about the majority’s approach.

It argues that the court:

  • Distorts the statutory text
  • Ignores historical context
  • And transforms a narrow provision into a sweeping tool of detention

Most importantly, the dissent highlights a fundamental problem: If “seeking admission” applies to anyone who has not been formally admitted, then the phrase loses its real-world meaning. It no longer describes an action—it becomes a legal fiction.

Statutory Interpretation at the Heart of the Case

This case is also a textbook example of how courts interpret statutes.

As discussed in Podcast 173:

  • Words should be given their ordinary meaning
  • But they must also be read in context

Here, context matters.

The statute itself states that individuals present without admission are deemed applicants for admission.

But does that automatically mean they are actively “seeking” admission?

That is the line the Fifth Circuit chose to erase.

A Broader Concern: Strategy and Jurisdiction

This case does not exist in a vacuum.

The Fifth Circuit is widely viewed as one of the most conservative appellate courts in the country. And its rulings are binding across:

  • Texas
  • Louisiana
  • Mississippi

As raised in the podcast discussion, there is growing concern that:

  • Cases may be channeled into this jurisdiction
  • And detainees may be held in facilities within this circuit
  • So that this interpretation becomes controlling

If true, the implications extend far beyond this single case.

What This Means Going Forward

The Fifth Circuit’s decision raises fundamental questions:

  • Can the government expand detention authority through interpretation alone?
  • What happens to due process when bond hearings disappear?
  • And how should courts balance statutory text with decades of practice?

For now, in the Fifth Circuit, the answer is clear: Mandatory detention applies—even to those who have lived in the United States for decades.

Why You Need to Listen to Podcast 173

This case is complex—but its consequences are not.

In Podcast 173, we break it down in a way that matters:

  • What the law says
  • What the court decided
  • Where the reasoning holds—and where it breaks
  • And why this case could reshape immigration enforcement
  • Most importantly, we connect the legal analysis to the human reality behind it.

Because at the end of the day, this case is about more than statutory language. It’s about whether people living in this country—sometimes for decades—can be detained without the opportunity to even ask for release.

Episode Summary Points:

  • Statutory Interpretation and the “Seeking Admission” Conflict: The heart of this discussion involves the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Buenrostro Mendez v. Bondi, which centers on the precise legal meaning of a two-word phrase: “seeking admission.” Richard Wilson explains that for nearly 30 years, spanning five presidential administrations, the government interpreted the immigration statute to distinguish between people arriving at a border and those who have lived in the U.S. for decades. Under this long-standing interpretation, long-term residents were considered “applicants for admission” but not “aliens seeking admission,” a distinction that granted them the right to a bond hearing. The current administration and a two-judge majority on the Fifth Circuit have upended this precedent, ruling that the terms are interchangeable. This shift effectively denies bond eligibility to individuals who have been law-abiding members of their communities for over 20 years, leading to indefinite detention without the possibility of release pending their hearings.
  • Forum Shopping and the Impact of Binding Precedent: The episode highlights the strategic use of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, widely regarded as the most conservative appellate court in the United States. By bringing this case specifically to a jurisdiction covering Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, the government successfully established a “binding precedent” that deviates from the rest of the country. Richard notes a troubling trend where immigrants detained in other states (like California) are reportedly being transferred to detention centers within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction to ensure they are denied bond under the Mendez ruling. This “forum shopping” not only isolates detainees from their families and legal support but also creates a fragmented legal landscape where a person’s right to due process depends entirely on which state they are detained in.
  • The Dissent’s Critique: The discussion examines the sharp dissent from Judge Dana Douglas. Notably, she omitted the traditional “respectfully” from her conclusion, simply stating, “I dissent.” Her opinion argues that the majority “strained at a gnat” to reach a specific political outcome, ignoring the common-sense meaning of words and the surrounding context of the statute. Richard emphasizes that the majority’s use of a “college admission” analogy was a distraction designed to bypass the reality that the statute is—at the very least—ambiguous. By ignoring 350 prior cases and 30 years of consistent history, the court has moved away from the democratic ideal that laws should be interpreted consistently and predictably, rather than at the whim of the current administration.
  • The “Tiger by the Tail”: A Critique of Judicial Overreach: The discussion shifts to a sharp critique of the majority’s decision, likening their approach to “grabbing a tiger by the tail.” Richard Wilson argues that the two-judge majority has taken on a radical reinterpretation that exceeds their judicial mandate and ignores the practical reality of the law. By choosing to interpret “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” as interchangeable, the court has disregarded 30 years of history, the practices of five prior presidential administrations, and the consistent rulings of 350 other district courts. The episode emphasizes that if Congress had intended to mandate the detention of over two million people without bond—a move with massive economic and logistical consequences—it would not have done so through “statutory silence” or ambiguous phrasing.
  • The Laken Riley Act and Statutory Redundancy: A pivotal point in the dissent by Judge Dana Douglas involves the Laken Riley Act, named after the nursing student killed by a non-citizen. Richard explains that this Act specifically added provisions to the law allowing for the detention of non-citizens without bond if they have committed certain violent crimes. Judge Douglas argues that if the majority’s interpretation of the original statute (1225) were correct—meaning all non-citizens could already be held without bond—then the Laken Riley Act would be superfluous. There would be no need for Congress to pass a law specifically denying bond to criminals if the law already allowed the government to deny bond to everyone. This logical inconsistency suggests the majority’s reading contradicts the clear legislative intent of Congress.
  • The Path to the Supreme Court: The episode concludes with an analysis of why the case is likely headed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Richard notes that the dissenters in the Fifth Circuit chose not to seek an en banc (full court) hearing, likely because the court’s current composition—illustrated by recent controversial rulings on the Ten Commandments in schools—makes a reversal there improbable. Instead, they are “green-lighting” the case for a faster appeal to the high court. Richard predicts that strict constructionists on the Supreme Court, like Justice Gorsuch, may ultimately side with the dissent. He argues that a granular look at the statute’s minutiae will likely reveal that “seeking admission” is a key limiting term, not a “throwaway phrase,” potentially leading to a reversal of the Fifth Circuit’s decision.

References for Podcast 173:

  1. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
  2. Covarrubias v. Bondi, No. 25-40701 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (consolidated with Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi).
  3. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing).
  4. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (Apprehension and detention of aliens).
  5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
  6. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018).
  7. Matter of Figueroa, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
  8. Rainosek, J. (2026, April 21). Questions and points for consideration: Buenrostro-Mendez & Covarrubias case (unpublished notes).
  9. Rainosek, J. (2026). Podcast 173: Questions and legal analysis outline (unpublished manuscript).
  10. United States Code. (2024). Title 8—Aliens and Nationality.

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Seeking Admission Or Losing Freedom? The Fifth Circuit Redefines Immigration Detention With Richard Wilson

This is a show where Richard Wilson and I try to present cases to you so that you can have a much greater understanding of what is going on in the court system. Now, Richard has chosen a case that I think is extremely interesting because it addresses issues around immigration. It is going to give you some ideas because I certainly did not understand all the acts, statutes, and other things that are really related to immigration. I was thankful. I did read it all, Richard, this time. I did not read just your highlights. I am going to turn it over to you and have you start us in a general way. Of course, I have lots of questions, and I know you have lots of comments.

Overview Of The Mendez V Bondi Case

The particular case we are dealing with today is not a US Supreme Court case. Instead, it is a recent case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the federal court that has jurisdiction over the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. By recent, I mean a case that was decided about two months ago. The name of the case is Buenrostro Mendez v. Bondi. I will just call it Mendez, but this case concerns an illegal alien who was detained by the government and who sought a bond hearing and to be granted a bond to be released from custody.

The district court in this individual’s circumstance. There was another applicant or alien as well by the name of, hold on just a second, by the name of Covarrubias, who was also in the same situation. Each of these individuals was detained by the government with the intention of deporting them. They filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that because they had been in the country and were not detained while trying to enter the country, they were entitled to a bond hearing.

In both of their circumstances, the district courts said that yes, they were entitled to a bond hearing, granted them a bond, and they had been released from custody. The United States government, the second name in the case, Bondi, is Pam Bondi, our former attorney general. The government chose to appeal the decisions of these two district courts to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The particular case we are dealing with deals with the construction of an immigration statute. Generally, what we are discussing will be certain legal rules that involve the interpretation of all statutes, all laws that are out there, because quite often cases hinge upon what a particular law means, whether it is a criminal law, or in this case, a law concerning immigration, or a statute concerning private civil rights of action and the ability to collect damages.

Hot Topic Bold Talk | Richard Wilson | Immigration Detention

Generally, the discussion will touch upon statutory interpretation. Specifically, it will touch upon the rights of these two individuals and whether or not they were entitled to a bond hearing. With that broad introduction, I will open it up and let you, as you always do, ask your questions, and hopefully I will understand this well enough and can explain this clearly enough that I will help some of the listeners out.

I have no doubt you will. One of the things that might be helpful, just as in the beginning stage, is a way that this has been purposefully sent to this specific court because it is so conservative. At any point in our discussion, I would like you to explain some of the dynamics that go on around it. I do not care when you do that, but I think it would be something that would be important for the listeners to understand.

One of the things that really bothers me is that Bondi was using the term seeking admission as a way to justify eliminating the bonds that these two individuals received. I do not understand the language of seeking admission versus some of the other things that I read in the case. I really appreciate you defining and clearly showing us what that means. Also, what happens when someone arrives in the US and seeks entry? Is a foreign person already here because they have lived here for years? I am going to ask you to answer those questions for me. Thank you.

Defining “Seeking Admission” Versus “Applicant For Admission”

Ultimately, you have touched upon the key issue. While the opinion goes on for, I think, 43 pages, ultimately the entire discussion by both the two judges in the majority and the one judge on this panel who dissents from the decision involves the meaning of a two-word phrase, seeking admission. The statute is part of the general statutes concerning immigrants and the ability of immigrants to obtain admission to the country and obtain the proper legal status in this country.

One of the provisions in the same group of statutes concerns people being able to seek asylum when they are from certain countries where asylum might be appropriate. There are two particular phrases in the statute. One is the phrase seeking admission, and the other is the phrase applicant for admission. The importance and the distinction between the two is that if you are an applicant for admission, you fall under another particular section of the immigration code, which allows you to seek a bond.

What I mean by seek a bond is that it goes back to basic criminal law. If someone has ever been arrested, say for disorderly conduct or any other circumstance, you can typically have a bond set. When you post that bond, you are released from jail, and you are allowed to remain out of jail until you wait for your trial takes place. It works the same way with certain subsets of immigrants. Some of them qualify for and can seek a bond.

Once they are granted a bond, if they post that bond, they are then released from custody and are free to return to their homes or residences and to wait outside of detention until their hearing takes place. That is ultimately what the whole dispute deals with. The two applicants were arguing that an immigrant seeking admission is different from an applicant for admission. In particular, they were saying they were applicants for admission.

Difference Between Entering At A Port Of Entry And Being Detained While Already In The Country

They were not seeking admission. What do those two terms mean, because I am talking about them in the abstract? Seeking admission, what these gentlemen were arguing to the courts was that someone showing up and trying to enter the country at a port of entry or outside of a port of entry. By port of entry, I mean someone landing at Intercontinental Airport here in Houston or JFK in New York and attempting to go through customs and enter the country seeking admission, or someone showing up on one of the bridges crossing the Rio Grande and in the same regard attempting to enter our country through an immigration checkpoint. They are seeking admission at a port of entry.

Seeking admission could also deal with people who are not going through ports of entry. Someone who chooses to cross the river at an area where you do not have a bridge, in an immigration checkpoint, or someone who chooses to scale or cut a hole in our wall that we have been building, and to come into the country that way. Seeking admission does not just involve someone showing up at a port of entry, which I deem to be an immigration checkpoint.

It also deals with anyone attempting to enter the country. The point of these two gentlemen was that we were not seeking admission. If we were, we would not be entitled to a bond. We are applicants for admission, which is entirely different. It is different because we were picked up and detained on the street while in the country or in our residence while in the country. In the case of one of these gentlemen, he had been here for 23 years. In the case of another one of these gentlemen, he had been here for sixteen years.

It is a point that the dissent makes in disagreeing with the majority interpretation, where they point out that we are detaining people that have been law-abiding citizens, members or have been law abiding while they have been in the country and who have, in some cases, children and even grandchildren who are citizens of the United States because they were born here, which is a separate argument that the Supreme Court is or will be taking up, that being birthright citizenship.

These two gentlemen argued that because they were applicants for admission, because they were detained while already in the country, and were not seeking admission at the time they were detained, they were entitled to a bond. Now, the majority disagreed with them. What the majority said with regard to the statute was, “Seeking admission and applicant for admission are interchangeable. You have agreed and acknowledged that you are an applicant for admission.”

Because these two terms, as we read the statute, are the same, that means you were seeking admission as well. Now, the critical legal difference here is that because the two-judge majority decides that these gentlemen were seeking admission, the two-judge majority then decides these two gentlemen were not entitled to a bond. I disagree with the majority. I disagree strongly with the majority. I am going to start telling you why.

At any point, please feel free to interrupt me because when I get on a roll, I still do not talk very fast. My voice may get louder, but I do not talk very fast. First off, again, we are talking about statutory construction and statutory interpretation. One of the main issues when you are dealing with statutory interpretation is that you generally use a word as it is commonly understood. You use the common meaning of a word if it is not defined by the statute. That is where I would like to start. Because I am talking about this in the abstract, I want to go ahead and put up the particular statute we are dealing with, and let me know if you can see it.

I cannot see it yet. There we go.

Analyzing Statutory Text 1225 A And The Definition Of “Applicant For Admission”

In particular, what I have highlighted in a bright color here is 1225A. Now we are talking about a different subdivision of the statute, but the reason I have highlighted 1225A is because it reads, and everyone can read along with me, “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States, whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who was brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.”

Why am I reading that particular subsection of the statute? It is because when a statute does this, it has defined the term applicant for admission. It concludes, “Shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter, an applicant for admission.” We have a definition of that particular three-word phrase, applicant for admission. As I pointed out, it talks about aliens who are present in the United States and are not admitted, which these two gentlemen were.

It talks about aliens arriving in the United States, whether or not they arrived through a designated port of arrival. It even points out that this includes aliens who might be intercepted in international waters and brought to the United States. We have a definition for an applicant for admission. The particular statute, though, that we are dealing with is this subsection, and that is B2A. You see here that the brighter highlighting refers to an alien seeking admission.

I see these two phrases as being different. Why? First off, as I pointed out, this statute or this chapter of the statute has been chosen to or has been structured so that it defines an applicant for admission. We have got a term that has been defined by the statute, as I read it. The second thing is with reference to seeking admission, what the majority does is they take these words, and they use them in the abstract in their opinion. What they do not do, one of the ways you determine what a word means in a statute, in addition to its general meaning, is you look at the surrounding language in the statute to determine what the meaning of the word might be.

Let me use the word stream as an example. If I choose to stream a movie, that means something different from looking at the trees that overhang a stream. One, of course, involves what our viewers might be doing right now on their computers. The other one actually involves a physical body of water. You know what I am referring to by using that word stream by examining it in the surrounding context, the sentence or paragraph in which it is used. This is a basic rule of English construction and interpretation. This is the type of stuff we learned in grade school or junior high, or if you went to a school as small as I did, maybe you were in high school before you finally figured it out.

These are things we learn literally as children. The reason I mention that is with regard to the particular statute or particular subsection of this chapter, when they refer to seeking admission, if you go to 2B, there is an exception. The exception says it shall not apply to an alien who is a crewman or to an alien who is a stowaway. Now, last I checked, if I get intercepted by ICE while driving north on I-45 out of downtown Houston, or while driving south out of Dallas on I-35, I am not a crewman or a stowaway. I am someone in the country.

These particular exceptions to the statute would only apply to someone who is arriving on a boat or a plane coming into the country. Someone who is arriving at a port of entry, using that language from the definition for an applicant for admission. The other thing is if you look at 2C, it says in the case of an alien described in subparagraph A, who was arriving on land, whether or not at a designated port of arrival from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States.

Again, the seeking admission when you look at the surrounding language concerning this term, it is talking about people trying to come into the country. With regards to B, there is an exception here where it does not apply if I am, say, the flight attendant on a plane or if I am in the engine room of a ship coming into territorial waters. With regards to B, basically the point there is, if I am showing up at a port of arrival, say at a bridge, and the country deems that I am authorized to enter the United States, then what they do is they do not have to take me in custody and hold me without bond.

They can simply turn me away and send me back to the country I am trying to enter from, be it Canada or Mexico, since those would be the two particular foreign territories that are contiguous to the United States, meaning their borders touch ours. The point I am making here is that within this sub-chapter of the statute 2A, if you look at 2B and 2C, where they are carving out particular exceptions.

They all concern people trying to get into the country, not someone who has already lived here for 16 or 23 years, as was the case with these two gentlemen. In my opinion, the two-judge majority just completely ignores the surrounding circumstances of the statute. They completely ignore the fact that an applicant for admission has been defined by the statute. What is something else that they ignore?

One of the things that has been talked about with regards to this case is that for the past five presidential administrations prior to Trump 47, this particular section of sub-chapter of the statute that I have still got up on the screen had been interpreted by the administration by ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement under prior presidential administrations, to view someone who was already in the country as an applicant for admission, but not an alien seeking admission. You have almost 30 years of prior history where someone like these two gentlemen, who were taken off the street after being in the country for a substantial period of time, would have been entitled to a bond because this particular sub-chapter did not apply to them. That is important too.

I want to interrupt you here for a moment because I think we are going to talk about the dissent in a moment, and I think the dissent really clarifies how ridiculous the two judges interpreted this statute and focused on this particular A, ignoring B, and then even, I do not think, paid much attention to C in this situation. What I am really concerned about is that you pointed out to me that there are 350 other cases for immigrants who were already in the country and were eligible to release a bond, but you are not hearing any of that in the way that this court is deciding how to define something.

To me, one of the things that I see, and I will just mention this, and then we will go on with the legal aspects of it, but it is disturbing to me that when judges have been appointed by Trump, they always seem to find a way to support what he wants them to do, but they do not stick with the statute itself. I am going to put that out there, and I am not asking for anything except to acknowledge that.

Because to me, it is very clear that the one you read in red says what an applicant is for admission. I do not care if you have been here 23 years or you have been here sixteen years. If you have been here, you have not been a criminal. You have been a law-abiding citizen who has contributed to our community. How in the world did the two judges ignore the applicant for admission? It is like they just left it out. I do not know how. Please explain this to me.

Disregarding 350 Prior Decisions And Decades Of Consistent Statutory Interpretation

First off, you mentioned that I mentioned to you that there were 350 decisions that had found that individuals in the circumstance of these two gentlemen were not seeking admission using that phrase. The specific source for that is actually from page six of the majority opinion. They acknowledged by citing a case that listed the 350 prior decisions, finding that persons in the circumstances of these two gentlemen were entitled to a bond.

The majority does acknowledge that to be the case, but then kind of completely disregards whatever the effect might be of that. The manner in which prior administrations have interpreted the law to me is important. The reason it is important is that a great part of this experiment in democracy that our country has undertaken over the past 250 years is that we will have laws, and those laws will be interpreted consistently.

The whole idea is, in contrast to the monarchies that existed in the 16th and 17th centuries, in the 18th century, when we finally sought our independence from one of those existing monarchies, it allowed for decisions to largely be made at the whim of the monarch based on whatever they felt like doing that day. A strong part of democracy is that the statute will be interpreted the same each and every time.

[bctt tweet=”A strong aspect of democracy is that statutes are interpreted consistently over time.” via=”no”]

This particular statute, in some version of it, has been in existence for quite some time. The most recent amendments to the statute were in 1996. This means that in Clinton’s second term, individuals like these two were viewed as not being aliens seeking admission because they had already been in the country for some time. Under both terms of George W. Bush, individuals in the position of these two were viewed not to be aliens seeking admission.

During both terms of the Obama administration, individuals like these two were viewed by immigration as applicants for admission, but not aliens seeking admission, so that they were entitled to a bond. In Trump’s first term, as the 45th president of the United States, individuals like these two were viewed as applicants for admission, but not aliens seeking admission, and would have been entitled to a bond. Finally, when Biden was president, they were viewed the same way.

It has only been during Trump’s second term that, suddenly, the White House or Immigration and Customs Enforcement has chosen to interpret this statute differently from the manner in which it had been interpreted for the past 29 or 30 years in an effort to try to detain persons that had been in the country for an extended period of time and to do so without granting them a bond. It also troubles me that the majority does not pay heed to that, that you have almost 30 years of prior consistent interpretation of this statute.

That and the 350 cases are important for a particular reason. I am not going to go into all of the details of the majority opinion and their justifications for why they did what they did and how they did what they did. A lot of the rules of law on which the two-judge majority relies are rules of law that apply when you have a statute that is not ambiguous, when it is not capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. The problem with the majority opinion, I say the problem.

Another problem with the majority opinion is they just assume that there is only one reasonable interpretation of this statute. To me, that assumption is betrayed by the language of the statute. It is betrayed by the decisions in 350 other cases before this two-judge majority decided to interpret it differently. It was read in that manner for over 29 years by five prior presidential administrations.

Government’s Strategy Of Forum Shopping In The Conservative 5th Circuit

It seems to me that all of that evidence, because let us call it that, evidence shows that the reading that these two applicants were presenting to the court was a reasonable reading of the statute, which would make the statute ambiguous, which would mean that the rules of the law that the majority relies upon. The crutch the majority uses to reach its decision is not applicable to this case when you have an ambiguous statute.

You touched upon it previously, and you mentioned it in passing again, but what is it about this particular case that the attorney general decided, “This is the one I am going to take up to one of the circuit courts of appeal, one of the twelve appellate courts underneath the United States Supreme Court that decides issues of federal law?” The answer to that is that we are in the Fifth Circuit.

We are in Texas, where these two gentlemen were, where these decisions came from. The Fifth Circuit, I think, many lawyers you ask are going to acknowledge the Fifth Circuit is the most conservative of the twelve appellate courts in the US court system. The Fifth Circuit is the court from which the Dobbs case came, which was out of Mississippi, but which was contrary to Roe v. Wade before the United States Supreme Court finally overruled Roe v. Wade.

In fact, the Fifth Circuit has decided many issues before it where, to paraphrase what the Supreme Court has done, even with what people refer to as a 6-3 conservative majority, the Supreme Court has looked at the Fifth Circuit’s interpretations and has basically said, “You are going too far here.” The attorney general wanted this case in front of the Fifth Circuit because that was, in the practice of law, what we refer to as forum shopping.

They were picking a court where they had a better chance of getting the decision they wanted because judges are subjective. They are people just like you and me. Judges decide different issues in different ways. They thought, “This is our best chance of getting a court to agree with us and follow this new interpretation after 30 years of trying to give this statute.” How is it that they are able to do this? You and I may have discussed this previously.

Maybe it was in private, maybe it was during one of our prior podcasts, but there was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that dealt with, of all things, immigration cases, where the court said, “When you have got a single applicant, you cannot issue a nationwide injunction or a ruling that will have a national effect.” The rulings you issue will only have an effect on the applicants you are dealing with.

What that has resulted in is despite the fact that there were 350 other decisions that said someone living in this country is not seeking admission, they are already here. As a result, they are entitled to a bond. Those 350 other decisions did not control what happened in this case. In this case, the Fifth Circuit was able to make its own decision and adopt the reading of the statute that the Attorney General presented to it. What is the effect of that?

Now, with the Fifth Circuit making this decision, at least in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, you have what is referred to as binding precedent. The next time somebody comes into a court in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, or Jackson, Mississippi, or Austin, Texas, and they have filed a habeas corpus petition saying, “I have lived in this country for a decade. I am entitled to a bond,” that district court now has to say, “No, you are not. According to the Fifth Circuit, you are an alien seeking admission, and you are not entitled to a bond because you fall under this particular sub-chapter of the statute.”

I do not practice immigration law, but I have talked to one immigration lawyer who mentioned to me that in discussing what has been happening with other immigration attorneys, there is subjectively a belief amongst immigration lawyers in Texas that what the administration has been doing, in particular since the Mendez opinion was handed down, is when they are taking immigrants into custody that have lived in our country for a year or 10 years or 20 years.

[bctt tweet=”Since the Mendez decision, there’s been a troubling shift—long-term immigrants are being detained and, depending on the jurisdiction, transferred to Texas or Louisiana to limit their chances of bond.” via=”no”]

If they are doing it in California or in some other jurisdiction where they think this person might be able to get out on a bond, they are taking those immigrants and are literally sending them to detention centers in Texas and Louisiana. The believed effect of that is twofold. One is that you are isolating them from their support structure, people who could visit them and people who could hire lawyers to assist them.

Two is you are trying to take an inordinately large number of people living in this country who have been detained, and you are now trying to put them in a jurisdiction. That being the Fifth Circuit, where the federal government will not have to release them on bond because this particular court has decided they are not entitled to be released on bond.

I want to pause here and say I am so grateful that you are going into the details of this because I think people in America are not paying attention to what is going on in the court. When something comes up like this, they do not have the data to say, “Wait a minute, there are 350 cases that these two people should have gotten the bond, and they should have been released and given a chance to resolve whatever it is through an application. I think what bothers me about this is that our prior person, I think she purposely chose the Fifth Circuit because she wanted to find a way to control the authority over any immigrant that she wants to deport or wants to have detained.

She made that decision so she could please the president that she supported, which, of course, is Trump. I think that is the thing that disturbs me the most. The courts are supposed to be a place where we, as Americans, whether we are legal or illegal in this country, however we got here, we have the right to due process, and we have the right to consider what the history of our legal statute is. It is not happening here. I am very glad that you pointed out the Mendez case because it set up a situation where how many circuit courts do we have? How many did you say?

You have eleven regional circuit courts and then one for the District of Columbia.

You got one circuit court that is doing the total opposite of what all the rest have because Mendez has given them a chance to look at specific cases. People need to understand that some of the decisions that are being made in the Supreme Court, you may not understand them until you see the connection with a circuit court decision like this one and say, “Now I see what the game is.” It is all about deporting, or it is all about detaining. Particularly, you know, I hate like heck to live in Texas, and I know some of my friends in Louisiana and Mississippi hate what is going on here.

I have spent my life listening to how the Fifth Circuit has always been very conservative. My question to you is, can you tell us some of the rationale that the dissent used? It is very pertinent. I think that it allows the rest of us to say, “No, that is what I want to happen with immigrants who live in the United States.” I want to see this, so then we can make decisions about judges who do not support these ideas. Please give some information about the dissent, Richard.

Before jumping to the dissent, one more negative comment about the majority opinion. I find it problematic that they chose to metaphorically or to use the analogy that applicants for admission to our country were the same as someone seeking admission to a college, applying for admission to a college.

Wait a minute. I want to go back to that because when I read this case, and I saw them applying it to someone applying for a college, I thought, “This is ridiculous.” The case is that you are deciding whether a person can go to a university or not. You are deciding whether a person has the right to have the freedom of life and liberty that we talk about all the time in our democracy. Please go there next, and then we will go to the dissent.

I talked about it broadly and said I would not go into specific examples. Since I went ahead and stepped in, threw myself into this briar patch, I will. What the majority does is you are right. I find it to be a really inapplicable circumstance where they are again, the statute defines the applicant for admission. What the majority does is they choose to analogize someone seeking admission or legal status in this country to someone seeking admission to a college, be it a local community college or an Ivy League college. It does not matter to me.

It is an improper analogy. As I said, they do this to really try to avoid the reality of the circumstance, which is that the language in the statute is ambiguous. It is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. It is like three-card Monte or a magician. They have created a distraction over here to hide you from all of the laws and rules concerning the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. To me, the fact that they had to resort to that shows just how lacking in support or substantiation the majority opinion is.

Analysis Of Judge Douglas’s Dissenting Opinion On Statutory History And Intent

In moving to the dissent, because that was what you asked me about and I chose not to follow your prompt, I would start by pointing out that one of the things in the dissent that the judge says is normally when a judge dissents, the language they use is “I respectfully dissent.” The particular judge in this case, Dana Douglas, who issued the dissenting opinion, does not respectfully dissent. Her opinion simply reads, “I dissent.” Typically, when a judge does that, it is because they have a certain level of displeasure at the opinion from which they are dissenting. Before saying that, she says, “Straining at a gnat, the majority swallows a camel.”

[bctt tweet=”Judicial dissents are usually framed with ‘I respectfully dissent.’ In this case, Judge Dana Douglas simply wrote, ‘I dissent’—a stark signal of deep disagreement with the majority’s reasoning.” via=”no”]

That is not an analogy I am familiar with, but as I understand it, it is similar to grabbing a tiger by the tail. You have really taken on something that is above and beyond your ability to handle it. That is what the majority seems to have done in this particular case. What the dissent does, and it is one of the reasons I agree with it, is the dissent touches upon many of the things that you and I have already discussed.

The judge at one point on page 24 of the 43 page opinion, the dissenting judge says that in Mendez’s case, the court reasoned that as almost every district court to consider this issue has concluded, the statutory text, which we have discussed, the statute’s history, which we have discussed, congressional intent, and Section 1226A’s application to non-citizens already present in the United States for the past three decades support a finding that 1226 applies to these circumstances.

While we are talking about Statute 1225B2A, the importance of 1226 is that it is the entitlement to a bond. What the dissent is pointing out is that you have got the text, you have got the history behind the statute, you have got the intent of Congress with the statute, and the statute’s application by 350 other courts, and the past five administrations over three decades all support the applicant’s readings of the statute and their arguments.

At this point, some people might be thinking, “If they are illegal aliens, whether they show up at a bridge in Tijuana or they are taken from an apartment in Chicago, what does it matter if they are illegal aliens?” With regards to congressional intent, there is an importance, there is a distinction to be made between someone trying to come into the country and someone like these two gentlemen who have been in the country for some time, who have, whether it is under a false social security number, otherwise these are people who have been contributing to our economy, who have been law-abiding citizens, who very well may have children who are citizens of this country.

Given those circumstances, the view of Congress is to treat people already in the country differently, to provide them some privilege for being these types of individuals who have contributed in a gainful way to our economy. To those of you who might be saying, “They are criminals. You do not know for certain that they are the type of individual you are saying they are.” I would say that, likewise, Congress’s intent betrays that counterargument because on the same page, page 24, the dissenting judge Douglas points out the Laken Riley Act.

Argument That The Lake And Riley Act Would Be Superfluous

For those who might not be familiar with it, Laken Riley was the nursing student in Georgia who was murdered by an illegal alien who was in the country. It turns out that the individual had been previously arrested for certain crimes, some of them violent crimes, but had not been detained and removed from our country. The Laken Riley Act created another chapter of the same statute we are talking about that made it clear where you have an applicant for admission that those individuals can be detained without bond if they have committed certain crimes that are set out in the Laken Riley Act.

What Judge Douglas does is she points out that if 1226 already allowed these individuals, any individual already in the country to be held without bond, then the Laken Riley Act would have been superfluous. The entire act and its passage would be unnecessary. The majority tries to counter this argument by saying, “Yeah, but the Laken Riley Act also has certain provisions for parole.”

The fact that it has certain provisions that do not apply to a bond does not mean that they would be rendering a large portion of the Laken Riley Act useless or superfluous because in addition to those parole statutes, the Laken Riley Act has particular provisions saying that individuals that have committed these crimes are not entitled to a bond that once they are detained, you do not get to release them.

Why put that in a law and have that law passed and have that law signed by President Trump if the statute already entitled you to hold an individual and not grant them bond, whether or not they had committed those crimes? Another point that is made by the dissent on page 25 of the opinion is that she points out that the majority views an alien seeking admission and an applicant for admission to be interchangeable, with no real difference.

She explains that this is not a credible reading of the statute and points out that, consistent with the statutory definition of admission, the provision’s context, the Supreme Court’s understanding of the statutory scheme, and the whole history of immigration law, seeking admission means something that it sounds like, which is actively seeking to enter the country at the point in time you are detained. That is another issue of language and interpretation that we have not touched on yet.

What the dissent points out is, are we talking about the present tense or the past tense in the language we are using? An alien seeking admission is present tense. The reason it is present tense is that it is applying specifically to people attempting to come into the country. These are rules of construction that the dissent relies upon and that I consider to be a better reading of the statute.

The other thing is on page 31, the dissent points out that the section that we are dealing with, or the chapter we are dealing with, 1225, refers to inspection by immigration officers. It refers to arriving aliens. It deals with people attempting to come into the country. The language she uses, that section is replete with references to arrival and inspection upon trying to enter the country. That is different from the 1226 statute, which permits a bond, which does not have any of that present tense language or the ability of the government to have immigration lawyers inspect the individuals or to take down information for individuals seeking admission.

Again, it is statutory construction. She concludes that seeking admission is not a throwaway phrase. It is not an extra phrase that means the same thing as an applicant for admission. It is a key term limiting the reach of 1225 B2A, which does not permit a bond to a smaller subsection of aliens or immigrants. That is those arriving at the border and trying to get into the country. The very things that we have been talking about during this discussion.

Something that I appreciate that she does is she talks about the fact that Congress does not secretly require, I am on page 36 in the case, Congress does not secretly require two million non-citizens to be detained without bond when nothing like this has ever been done before, and the whole history of American immigration laws suggests it would not be. We would expect more than simple statutory silence if and when Congress had the intent, had intended a major departure.

[bctt tweet=”Congress does not quietly mandate the detention of millions without bond—especially when history shows nothing like it has ever been done. A shift this major would require clear intent, not statutory silence.” via=”no”]

To me, when I read the case, it said to me, there is something seriously wrong with this decision. I do not know what the Supreme Court is going to do about it, but I certainly have grave concerns because they are going to have to. To me, they are going to have to set up or separate out Mendez and say, “Wait a minute, we cannot allow this. We have got one circuit court that is doing the total opposite of all the others.”

Three things here. I agree with you, and I agree with Douglas in the dissent. Her whole point is, look, if you are going to change a statute so that it has such an extraordinary effect economically on the government. Think about the cost of building detention facilities to hold an additional two million people. Her point is that if they intended to do that, they would have said it more clearly. It would not have been in language that five prior administrations had misinterpreted over 30 years, until suddenly this administration, which had had a prior four years to get it right, suddenly figures out the real meaning of the statute.

Prediction That The US Supreme Court Will Hear The Case And Reverse The Decision

The other thing is you touched upon, and this really is a good point to, I think, start to wrap things up, you have talked about the Supreme Court. There are two things here, one, a lot of times the Supreme Court will decide because you have got different appellate courts, different circuit courts that have interpreted the statute differently. You have conflicting opinions. I do not know that we are going to get that here. We may, because I think that the attorney general’s office had filed an appeal on another circuit that they thought also might be favorable to them.

I do not know whether or not they have abandoned that appeal now that they have got the decision they wanted, such that we will not have conflicting opinions. Nonetheless, this is the interpretation of a federal statute. This is an interpretation that will have a far-reaching and substantial economic effect. I would think this is the type of decision where the Supreme Court, if one of the applicants seeks cert or applies to have that court hear the case, very well might do so. In that regard, I would point out that one of the things that happened was just last week.

The same panel that decided the case refused to grant rehearing. After it did so, Douglas, the dissenting judge, did not request a vote for a rehearing en banc. What that would indicate to me is that the judge or judges who disagree with the majority opinion do not think they have the votes in the Fifth Circuit to reverse the decision of the two judges that issued this majority opinion. If they had decided to hear the case en banc, what would have happened is that the case would have been argued in front of all seventeen active judges in the Fifth Circuit, and then they would have made a decision, which could have taken some period of time.

[bctt tweet=”The dissenting judges did not believe they had the votes in the Fifth Circuit to overturn the majority. An en banc review would have brought the case before all seventeen active judges, with a new argument and a decision that could have taken considerable time.” via=”no”]

By not electing to vote for en banc, basically, what the Fifth Circuit has done is the judges who would be, who presume themselves to be in the minority, are not going to waste additional time. Essentially, they are green-lighting the applicants to go ahead and file for review with the United States Supreme Court to get the case there faster. That is my belief behind what is happening there and why we are not going to have an en banc opinion from the Fifth Circuit or an en banc hearing.

I would say that my opinion on this is probably supported by the fact that on April 21st in an en banc opinion, the Fifth Circuit decided to diverge from about 50 years of US law and decide that a law requiring the Ten Commandments be displayed in every classroom in public schools in the state of Texas, the Fifth Circuit said that law did not violate the freedom of religion clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Despite the fact that there is a case interpreting an almost identical statute from Kentucky years ago that said that the statute does violate the First Amendment to the Constitution concerning freedom of religion. I think that illustrates that if it had been decided en banc, the decision would have been the same as what this two-judge majority decided. I think that also illustrates just how conservative the Fifth Circuit is when it comes to these issues. I expect that what will happen is that one or both of these applicants will ask the US Supreme Court to hear the case.

The US Supreme Court will probably agree to hear the case. You will be able to get four judges who will say, “Let us take this issue up.” It would not shock me if we have a 5-4 or 6-3 opinion that ultimately agrees with the dissent because, amongst the so-called conservative judges, I have mentioned before that Justice Gorsuch is truly a strict constructionist when it comes to statutory interpretation.

Regardless of people’s feelings about him, this is a guy who is going to go very granular and dig into the minutia of the statute. When he does so, he is going to come to the same decision that the dissent did and say that no, these two different terms should have different meanings when used in the same sub-chapter of this statute. I think that, probably being a pragmatist, Kavanaugh or maybe even Chief Justice Roberts would fall on that side as well.

For the time being, this is the controlling law in Texas. I believe it is wrong, but I am not a judge. What I believe will not get you a cup of coffee at Starbucks. Still, I think that the Supreme Court ultimately will take this issue up, and I believe if they do so, they will reverse this erroneous decision in my opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit.

One of the things that is so important for us to all realize is that just because of Gorsuch, I do not know how to pronounce his name correctly. Just because Gorsuch is a Republican, that does not mean that he is going to do anything but do his duty as a judge and go into the details. Because he is a strict constructionist, which some people are concerned about when we use that terminology,it probably will lead to what you consider to be, and I consider to be, a much fairer decision for these two individuals. Richard, I am extremely grateful for the research and all the details that you have given us. I want to encourage my readers to do something.

Do not blank out when you are hearing some of Richard’s things about what these statutes mean. If you stay present and hear all the connections he has skillfully made to present this case to both you and me, then you are going to learn something about the law. All of us need to do it because right now, the courts are where we have some form of democracy. I want to thank everybody for tuning in, and Richard, as always. I am very grateful to have you as a friend and colleague, and I have thoroughly enjoyed talking with you. Thank you.

Thank you.

Important Links

References

About Richard Wilson

Hot Topic Bold Talk | Richard Wilson | Immigration Detention Richard Wilson is a veteran trial and appellate lawyer. His practice emphasizes the defense of professionals in federal and state courts, and before disciplinary agencies.

For over 20 years, Richard has focused on representing lawyers directly and on behalf of lawyers’ professional liability insurers.

During that time, he has defended and advised hundreds of lawyers and law firms against legal malpractice claims and professional ethics complaints.

His experience as a trial lawyer and with the law of lawyering has enabled him to both counsel and protect his lawyer clients when they find themselves parties instead of advocates or counselors.

Richard G. Wilson

KERR WILSON, P.C.

16676 Northchase Drive, Suite 450

Houston, Texas 77060

(281) 260-6304

EDUCATION

University of Texas at Austin, J.D., 1995

Louisiana State University, B.S., Finance, cum laude, 1992

BAR ADMISSIONS

State Bar of Texas

  1. S. District Courts for the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Districts of Texas
  2. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Kerr Wilson Houston, Texas

Shareholder 2008- present

  • Represented clients in breach of contract, tort, employment, and insurance cases
  • First chair trial experience
  • Lead counsel in multiple appeals in both state and federal appellate courts
  • Advisor for small and mid-sized businesses in the energy industry
  • Responsible for all facets of managing and operating a law office

McFall, Breitbeil & Shults Houston, Texas

Associate & Shareholder 2001- 2008

  • Represented clients in breach of contract, tort, employment, and insurance cases
  • First chair trial experience
  • Lead counsel in multiple appeals in both state and federal appellate courts
  • Established the budget, managed litigation, identified corporate objectives, retained local counsel and experts, and tried complex cases that were pending in multiple jurisdictions

Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Martin Houston, Texas

Associate 1997-2001

Hirsch, Robinson, Sheiness & Glover Houston, Texas

Associate 1995-1997

ACHIEVEMENTS
  • First chair jury trials in professional liability, breach of contract, insurance, trade secret, and personal injury cases
  • Appeals to the Fifth Circuit and Texas appellate courts
  • AV Rated by Martindale-Hubbell
PUBLISHED CASES
  • Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.)
  • O’Hern v. Mughrabi, 579 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.)
  • Sheller v. Corral Tran Singh, LLP, 551 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)
  • Kelly v. Nichamoff, 868 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2017)
  • Stallworth v. Ayers, 510 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.)
  • Galindo v. Prosperity Partners, Inc., 429 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, pet. denied)
  • Graper v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 756 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2014)
  • Allstate Tex. Lloyd’s v. McKinney, 964 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
  • Glattly v. Air Starter Components, Inc., 332 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)
  • Willbros RPI, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 601 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2010)
  • Duerr v. Brown, 262 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
  • Digges v. Knowledge Alliance, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)
  • Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003)
  • King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2002)
PUBLICATIONS
  • Author, From Advocate to Party – Defenses for Lawyers Who Find Themselves in Litigation, 61 LAW REVIEW OF SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW 43 (2020)
  • Author, Policy Benefits- Are They Recoverable Under Extra-Contractual Theories When A Covered Claim is Denied?, JOURNAL OF TEXAS INSURANCE LAW, Volume 12, Issue 5, at 17

(cited by the Texas Supreme Court in USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tex. 2018))

  • Author, The Additional Insured, an update of recent developments in Texas focusing on additional insured clauses and indemnity agreements
  • Co-author, Recent Legislation Concerning Attorneys

Texas Lawyers’ Insurance Exchange Newsletter

  • Panelist, Occurrence-Innocent Insured Pays Price for Guilty Third Party?

Presented to the Insurance Practice Section of the State Bar of Texas

REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE
  • Successfully defended an attorney in a two-week trial in federal court against fraud claims based on representations made during negotiations for the purchase of a multi-million-dollar interest in an oilfield services company.
  • Defended one of the world’s largest insurance brokers in a malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty case. This was one of the first cases to go to trial concerning broker duties related to the failure of Reliance. I obtained a take nothing judgment for the broker.
  • Defended an oilfield services company in a catastrophic injury case where the client destroyed the key piece of evidence after the accident. After a week-long trial, the jury returned a finding of minimal liability and damages against the client.
  • After a month long trial, obtained a take nothing judgment for a manufacturing company in a misappropriation of trade secrets case. Represented that client and several co-defendants in the appeal, and successfully reversed an unfavorable verdict against the co-defendants.
  • Successfully defended a liability insurer in a bad faith and Texas Insurance Code case concerning damages to a major pipeline. Obtained a summary judgment in the client’s favor, and persuaded the Fifth Circuit that the client’s coverage position was correct on appeal.
  • Represented an employer in an insurance coverage dispute all the way to the Texas Supreme Court, and persuaded the Texas Supreme Court to recognize coverage for the employer when an employee has committed an intentional act.
  • After being hired by a probate judge to defend him, successfully obtained the dismissal of a suit against him and on appeal defined the judicial immunity available to courts in Texas.
  • Obtained summary judgment for a law firm sued for malpractice over its handling of Sulzer implant cases. The summary judgment was affirmed on appeal.